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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) impacts 
millions of Americans during their working lives and at retirement.1  
Indeed, ERISA has profound implications for health care, as an 
approximate 1.9 million ERISA health care claims are denied each year.”2  
Approximately 45% of private workers in America participate in a 
qualified ERISA retirement plan.3  In 2011, multi-employer plans covered 
30 million employees.4  An excess of 150 billion dollars in assets are held 
in reserve for beneficiaries and private plan participants that have escaped 
the scrutiny of effective federal regulation.5  Thus, ERISA impacts 
millions of plan participants and beneficiaries. 
Since ERISA’s enactment, federal circuit courts have continuously 
disagreed on ERISA provisions.6  One such disagreement concerns the 
standard of judicial review that is applied to claims arising out of ERISA 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Frequently Asked Questions About 
Retirment Plans and ERISA, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_compliance_pension.html 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
 2 Carole Gresenze, Deborah R. Hensler, David M. Studdert, Bonnie Dombey-Moore 
& Nicholas M. Pace, A Flood of Litigation?: Predicting the Consequence of Changing 
Legal Remedies Available to ERISA Beneficiaries, IP 184 RAND HEALTH LAW 8 (1999). 
 3 PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT, http://www.
pbgc.gov/res/reports/ar2013.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014); see also PENSION BENEFIT 
GUARANTY CORPORATION ANNUAL, http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/pension-insurance-
data-tables-2011.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (Pension Insurance Data: Defined benefit 
plans cover approximately 35 million private and public sector active workers). 
 4 Colleen E. Medill, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE , 8 (3rd ed. 2011). 
 5 Id. 
 6 See e.g. Zurich American Insurance Company v. O’Hara, 604 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 
2010); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 2011); Pfeil v. State St. 
Bank & Trust Co., 671 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2012); Dudenhoefer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 2012 
U.S. App. LEXIS 18622 (6th Cir. Sept. 5, 2012). 
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plan interpretation.7  Specifically, numerous federal circuits have 
disagreed on the issue of whether the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
judicial review applies to all or to some practices of fiduciary plan 
interpretation in ERISA plans that grant discretionary interpretative 
authority upon the plan administrator.8  Plan interpretation encompasses 
several practices within ERISA, such as benefit determinations, 
determining the scope of fiduciary responsibility, implementing 
administrative rules in a plan, and determining the formula for benefits 
calculation. 
In ERISA civil cases, the standard of judicial review results in 
evidentiary implications that are highly outcome determinative.9  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch dealt 
with the issue of the standard of judicial review for denial of benefits 
claims.10  The Court held that the de novo standard of judicial review 
controlled review of denial of benefits claims, unless the plan granted 
discretionary authority upon the administrator, which would result in the 
application of an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.11 
The Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have weighed in on 
when and to what extent the arbitrary and capricious standard applies to 
interpretative powers outside the denial of benefits context when a plan 
grants interpretative power upon the plan administrator.12  The Ninth 
Circuit has recently added to the inconsistency among the circuits.13  The 
Ninth Circuit  interpreted Firestone and its progeny to mean that the plain 
language of the statute grants the  fiduciaries uninhibited discretion over 
all matters concerning plan interpretation, including  denial of benefit 
claims.14  This interpretation cloaks fiduciaries with the arbitrary and 
                                                                                                                                     
 7 Compare Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013) with John Blair 
Commc’n Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 8 Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013); Hunter v. Caliber Sys. 
Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 711 (6th Cir. 2000), Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 
1995); John Blair Commc’n Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360, 369 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
 9 See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (inferring that 
once a plan grants discretionary authority upon a fiduciary in the denial of benefits context, 
the less demanding arbitrary and capricious standard of review shift a court’s review 
towards fiduciaries’ favor). 
 10 Id. at 111. 
 11 Id.; see also Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010) (limiting the application 
of the Firestone’s de novo standard); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) 
(interpreting Firestone). 
 12 Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013); Hunter v. Caliber Sys. Inc., 
220 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2000), Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995); John Blair 
Commc’n Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 13 Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 14 Id. at 1077. 
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capricious standard on any plan interpretation decision.15  The Second 
Circuit’s stands at opposite to the Ninth Circuit. The Second Circuit has 
refused to expand the arbitrary and capricious standard in Firestone 
beyond the denial of benefits context.16  The Third and Sixth Circuits 
justify the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard outside of 
the denial of benefits context, but do not state how far the arbitrary and 
capricious standard should apply to plan interpretation.17 
Considering most workers do not save enough for retirement,18 
creating remedial safeguards to protect what little monies these workers 
have is critical to our nation’s financial future.  Even though Congress has 
amended ERISA to include criminal and civil provisions, “the protection 
accomplished by statute has not been sufficient to accomplish 
Congressional intent.”19  The promotion and creation of ERISA plans by 
employers are equally important.  This comment proposes that the 
arbitrary and capricious standard should apply to all plan interpretation 
practices to promote plan creation, and as a result, reviewing courts should 
adopt broader remedial safeguards when reviewing whether an act is 
arbitrary and capricious to protect plan participants and beneficiaries. 
This comment reviews the origin of, and hence the policy behind, the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, while identifying the extent to 
which several circuits grant deference to fiduciaries on plan interpretation.  
Part I of this comment provides a background to Congress’s intent in 
                                                                                                                                     
 15 Id. at 1077. 
 16 John Blair Commc’n Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 
1994); see, e.g., Asbestos Workers Syracuse Pension Fund by Collins v. M.G. Indus. 
Insulation Co., 875 F. Supp. 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review applies to denial of benefits claims when the plan grants discretion upon 
the trustee. After John Blair a distinction between claims arising from denial of benefits 
and claims not arising from denial of benefits arose. The arbitrary and capricious standard 
was not applied to administrative determinations balancing the interest of plan beneficiaries 
because the claim was not a denial of benefits claim. Instead, a strict prudent person 
standard was applied to the administrator’s interest determination.); see also Frommert v. 
Conkright, 738 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that a claim outside of the denial of 
benefits context, if not already held to adopt an arbitrary and capricious standard, requires 
review from a higher court to determine the appropriate standard of review.); Hammer v. 
First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3414 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2005) (stating 
that discretion is conferred upon the administrator when the plan grants such discretion. 
An exception has not been carved out to revert to de novo review if the claim is not a denial 
of benefits claim. Hammer involved a denial of benefits claim and a claim for untimely 
decision rendered from the plan’s appeals process.). 
 17 Hunter, 220 F.3d at 711; Moench, 62 F.3d at 565. 
 18 Ruth Helman, Greenwald & Associates, Nevin Adams, Craig Copeland & Jack 
VanDerhei, The 2014 Retirement Confidence Survey: Confidence Rebounds-for Those 
With Retirement Plans, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Mar. 2014. 
 19 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that ERISA §502(a)(3) provides the opportunity 
for plan participants and beneficiaries to bring civil suits for equitable and other relief). 
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enacting ERISA and the subsequent adoption of trust law to fill in gaps in 
ERISA’s remedial provisions.  Part II further investigates the meaning of 
the modern arbitrary and capricious standard as applied to ERISA.  Part II 
sets forth the Supreme Court Firestone decision and its progeny, which 
create the contours for ERISA judicial review analysis.  Part III identifies 
and captures the split between the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth 
Circuits.  In part IV, this comment proposes a resolution to the imbalance 
between promotion of plan creation and legal simplicity, and the 
safeguards afforded to plan participants and beneficiaries in the 
administrative appeals process and judicial arena.  Specifically, this 
comment posits that the arbitrary and capricious standard should continue 
to control the review of all plan administrators’ discretionary 
interpretation to promote plan creation.  Furthermore, this comment 
recommends the enlargement of evidentiary scope when reviewing an 
administrator’s decision, which would increase remedial safeguards for 
plan participants and increase the likelihood of a court finding an arbitrary 
and capricious act. 
II. BACKGROUND 
1. ERISA: Legislative Intent at the Time of Creation - 1974 
Congress enacted ERISA to protect plan participants and plan 
beneficiaries who were due benefits but were never paid.20  ERISA’s 
intent, in part, is to remedy pre-ERISA obstacles that hindered effective 
enforcement of fiduciary duties and to provide legal and equitable 
remedies to recover due benefits.21  To this extent, ERISA’s Congressional 
findings and policy declarations state: “[o]wing to the lack of . . . adequate 
safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the interests of 
employees and their beneficiaries . . . that safeguards be provided with 
respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such 
plans . . . .”22  “[T]he policy of [ERISA is] to protect . . . the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, 
                                                                                                                                     
 20 Carlton R. Sickles, Introduction: The Significance and Complexity of ERISA, 17 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 205 (1975). 
 21 H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655; 
see also S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871; cf. 
Emily C. Lechner, “Equitable” Relief Under ERISA: Where the Court’s Interpretation 
Stands and the Need to Redefine its Analysis to Reflect the Trust-Law Basis of ERISA, 
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COUNSEL, http://www.acebc.com/public-
docs/writing-comp-papers/2012_Equitable_Relief_Under_ERISA.pdf (explaining that 
federal courts are unclear about what about types of remedies fit within the meaning of 
equitable relief). 
 22 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2013). 
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by . . . providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to 
the Federal courts.”23  Congress’s intent in enacting ERISA is clear: 
“remedy[ing] certain defects in the private retirement system which limit 
the effectiveness of the system in providing retirement income security.”24 
Congress is also concerned with the careful balance of setting 
equitable standards and promoting the expansion of ERISA plans.25  
Congress implemented its objective by erecting preemption provisions,26  
replacing state laws,27  and providing state and federal venue for claim 
adjudication.28  Ultimately, ERISA codifies efforts to protect participants’ 
and beneficiaries’ rights under qualified29  ERISA plans.30 
Throughout ERISA’s general provisions, Congress clearly states that 
ERISA’s overall theme controls future enactments and guides interpreting 
courts.31  Accordingly, ERISA’s overall theme prescribes the careful 
balance of protecting plan participants and beneficiaries and the promotion 
of plan creation.32  Thus, any extension or interpretation of ERISA must 
carry out its purpose, which fundamentally includes providing adequate 
remedial protections to plan participants and beneficiaries.33 
2. ERISA’s Place in Employee Benefits: Statutory Background 
The need to protect employees through legislative enactments dates 
back to the early twentieth century.34  On the heels of industrialism, 
employers were managing revenue without regard to their employees’ 
                                                                                                                                     
 23 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 6 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1973)). 
 24 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 6 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1973)). 
 25 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 7. 
 26 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
 27 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051–61, 1081–86, 1101-14 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 93–533, at 17 
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655. 
 28 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
 29 Qualified status is unique to the I.R.C., which labels a plan as securing preferential 
tax benefits after satisfying numerous requirements specified by ERISA. 26 U.S.C. § 401 
(2014). The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 set specific requirements for employers to 
qualify for favorable tax treatment to the employer and plan participants. See I.R.C. 
§ 401(a) (2013) (setting design and operational requirements for a 401(k) to meet the 
qualification requirements). 
 30 S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973) reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871; H.R. 
REP. NO. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639. 
 31 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,  P.L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat 829 
(1974) (codified as amended at various sections of Titles 26 and 29 of the United States 
Code). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Christopher Carosa, 7 Deadly Sins Every ERISA Fiduciary Must Avoid: The 1st 
Deadly Sin – “Income Matters,” FIDUCIARY NEWS (May 24, 2011), http://fiduciary
news.com/2011/05/7-deadly-sins-every-erisa-fiduciary-must-avoid-the-1st-deadly-sin-
%E2%80%93-%E2%80%9Cincome-matters%E2%80%9D/. 
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future, taking advantage of the fact that the common laborers were 
generally unaware of retirement planning.35  As a result, Congress 
fashioned numerous legislative enactments to promote the creation of 
retirement plans and to protect employees and their beneficiaries. 
In the 1920’s, Congress created incentives for companies who 
established retirement plans by providing tax deductions.36  In the 1930’s, 
employers disproportionately contributed to the retirement funds of highly 
compensated employees.37  Congress enacted the Social Security Act in 
1935 to serve as our nation’s main and often sole retirement income.38  
Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act in 1958 
to increase protection to plan participants and beneficiaries.39  Throughout 
1960’s, long vesting requirements and harsh break in service rules negated 
much needed retirement funds to plan participants.40 
Congress finally enacted ERISA in 1974.41  As a body of employee 
benefits law, ERISA arose from two distinct federal statutes: 1) Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974;42 and 2) the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986.43  Three different federal statutes, vested within three 
different federal departments are bestowed with enforcement 
responsibilities. Namely, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act 
(“WPPDA”),44  the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”),45  and 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (“IRC”)46  each serve an important 
enforcement function.  The judiciary, however, serves as the only 
institution currently able to engage all aspects of ERISA’s labyrinth-like 
provisions. 
While Congress has made significant strides to improve workers’ 
retirement interest, federal statutes, however, fail to fully protect 
employees’ retirement interest.  The WPPDA regulates private pension 
systems for purposes of protecting plan participants’ rights and benefits.47  
Unfortunately, the WPPDA’s scope is limited to disclosure requirements 
                                                                                                                                     
 35 Id. 
 36 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 3. 
 37 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 3. 
 38 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 3. 
 39 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 5. 
 40 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 5. 
 41 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 
829 (1974)(codified as amended iat various sections of Titles 26 and 29 of the United States 
Code). 
 42 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2013). 
 43 I.R.C. §§ 1-9833 (2013). 
 44 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (2013). 
 45 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (2013). 
 46 I.R.C. § 401 (2013). 
 47 29 U.S.C. § 1031 (2013). 
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and therefore lacks substantive fiduciary standards.48  The WPPDA’s main 
inadequacy is found in its reliance upon the employee’s initiative to police 
and manage his own plan.49  Moreover, the LMRA provides guidelines to 
establish and administer jointly operated employer and union plans but 
fails to establish or provide standards for preserving vested benefits, 
funding adequacy, investment security, or fiduciary conduct.50 
Further, the IRC sets rules for a plan to attain “qualified status.”51  
Such qualified status grants deductions to the employer when the employer 
accrues a benefit for the employee.52  As the IRC’s leading function is to 
prevent evasion of tax obligations and generate revenue, the safeguards set 
forth by IRC to protect pension are limited.53  The IRC’s limited power 
includes granting or disallowing qualified status; i.e. the availability of a 
tax advantage and subsequent tax consequence.54  ERISA provides several 
avenues to enforce its provision, such as civil enforcements.55  ERISA’s 
complex provisions do not stand alone and have lead courts and Congress 
in need of guidance to reference and often adopt trust law principles. 
3. Trust Law in ERISA 
At inception, ERISA’s complex scheme required adoption of other 
areas of law to fill in gaps.  Congress referred to trust law for guidance in 
forming remedial provisions and the standards by which courts now 
review such provisions.  Referring to trust law as a guide to inform ERISA, 
courts have created remedial regimes by utilizing trust law as the default 
structure.56  Consequently, courts have continuously resorted to a 
presumptive dependence on trust principles, even though Congress 
                                                                                                                                     
 48 History of EBSA and ERISA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
 49 Robert G. Blakey, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962, 
38 NOTRE DAME L. 263 (1963). 
 50 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 185, 141-197 (2013); MEDILL, supra note 4, at 9. 
 51 I.R.C. § 401 (2013). 
 52 Id. 
 53 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 9. 
 54 MEDILL, supra note 4, at 9. 
 55 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a) (2013) (ERISA sets forth several claims from which civil 
litigation and civil enforcement actions may arise.  A plan participant or beneficiary may 
bring a claim to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan or to clarify rights for 
future benefits under the plan.  Typically, in a denial of benefits claim, a civil action is 
brought after the plan’s administrator has denied a claim for benefits and the participant or 
beneficiary has exhausted the plan’s administrative appeal procedure). 
 56 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008); Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 
F.3d 1061, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013); Hunter v. Caliber Sys. Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 711 (6th Cir. 
2000), Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1995); John Blair Commc’n Profit 
Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360, 369–70 (2d Cir. 1994). 
400 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:392 
intended trust principles to only be a temporary guide.57  Several courts 
have recognized that “[c]ommon law trust principles animate[, but do not 
control,] the fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA.”58  In enacting 
ERISA, Congress resorted to trust law to inhibit employer autonomy over 
employee benefit plans.59  Trust law supported Congress’ efforts to restrict 
plan fiduciary and trustee’s powers to alter the standard of review with 
self-serving language.60  Altogether, while trust principles continue to 
influence the courts, ERISA’s remedial scheme ultimately controls an 
ERISA analysis, and not trust law. 
When analyzing ERISA plan interpretation claims, common law 
trust principles have often been the starting point for courts.61  Many 
ERISA fiduciary duty provisions import fiduciary trust principles.62  
Congress, while forming a foundation from which courts could look to, 
did not propound an exact transposition of common law trust principles 
into ERISA.63  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“[t]rust law does not tell the entire story. After all, ERISA’s standards and 
procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the 
common law of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection.”64  
While “ERISA abounds with language and terminology of trust law,” a 
proliferation of trust law terminology does not mean that trust law is the 
only or best solution whenever a court tackles an ERISA plan 
interpretation question.65  Hence, ERISA was enacted as a regulatory 
regime while absorbing common law trust principles to guide and not to 
                                                                                                                                     
 57 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110–15 (1989) (noting that 
trust law is the default gapfiller in ERISA interpretation). 
 58 Acosta v. Pacific Enter., 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Cent. States v. 
Cent. Transp., 472 U.S. 559, 570–71 (1985)(noting that trust law should guide the 
interpretation of ERISA provisions). 
 59 John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and 
Judicial Review of Benefit Denials under ERISA, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1315, 1317 (2007). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115; S.REP. NO. 93-127, at 29 (1973), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4865; H.R.REP. NO. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649. 
 62 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000); S.REP. NO. 93-127,, at 29 (1973), reprinted in 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4865; H.R.REP. NO. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649. 
 63 See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The 
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105 (1988) (highlighting Congress’ failure to 
resolve several persistent inadequacies in ERISA through Congressional amendments to 
ERISA). 
 64 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996). 
 65 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110. 
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dominate ERISA’s purpose.66  ERISA may and should alter adopted trust 
principles when necessary.67 
ERISA fiduciary laws are uniquely premised on the statute’s purpose 
to protect plan participants and promote plan creation, which are different 
from conventional trust law.68  ERISA fiduciary duties govern plan 
administration as well as plan interpretation.69  Trust law presumes that 
trustees are disinterested and, generally, lack a personal stake in trust 
assets, while ERISA fiduciaries are employed and sometimes aligned with 
the employer or insurance company supplying the insurance benefit.70  The 
legislative safeguard arises from ERISA’s language, which demands plan 
fiduciaries to act “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries 
and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants 
and their beneficiaries . . . .”71  But, as a cost-effectiveness measure to 
promote the creation of plans, ERISA authorizes employers to use “an 
officer, employee, agent or other representative” as fiduciaries, thus 
creating an inherent conflict between trust law principles and the practical 
dynamics of fiduciary plan interpretation.72 
ERISA binds a plan administrator to act for the sole benefit of the 
plan participants and beneficiaries, but the employer pays, hires, or fires 
the plan administrator.  The conflict is apparent: an employer or insurance 
company cannot act without bias on behalf of himself and in the interest 
of the trust beneficiary.73  The Supreme Court has distinguished the 
inherent conflict between a plan administrator’s duty to act in the sole 
benefit of plan participants while being paid by the employer by citing to 
ERISA’s special nature and the careful balance needed to promote plan 
creation.74  Specifically, the Supreme Court has stated that an 
                                                                                                                                     
 66 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 302 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 
5083 (explaining that, when interpreting fiduciary standards, the purpose of ERISA must 
control). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Langbein, supra note 59, at 1326. 
 69 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000) (stating that the administration of plan assets 
and plan interpretation may include interpretation of benefits claim. Granting or denying 
claimed plan benefits entails the exercise of “discretionary authority” within the meaning 
of ERISA § 3(21)(A) or 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000)). 
 70 Langbein, supra note 59, at 1326. 
 71 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000). 
 72 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (2000); see ERISA §§3(16), 402(a), or 29 U.S.C. §§1002(16), 
1102(a) (2000) (making the employer the default plan administrator); ERISA 
§ 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000) (making plan administration a fiduciary 
function). 
 73 George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, Bogert’s Trust and Trustees, in The Law of 
Trusts and Trustees § 543, at 227 (rev. 2d ed. 1993). 
 74 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Langbein, supra note 59, at 1326. 
402 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:392 
“[e]mployer[], for example, can be [an] ERISA fiduciar[y] and still take 
actions to the disadvantage of employee beneficiaries, when they act as 
employers . . . .”75  Thus, the Supreme Court reduces liability under one 
conflict, where the employer pays the plan participant and is acting in the 
sole interest of the plan and its participants, in order to promote the 
creation of plans.76 
Furthermore, other fields aside from ERISA have adopted trust law 
principles for regulatory purposes.77  Congress has not fully transplanted 
trust law principles into other fields without regard to the purpose of such 
area of law.78  Accordingly, trust law principles naturally are modified, 
when applicable, to conform to ERISA’s purpose.  It follows then, that 
Congress’ intent to simultaneously promote the creation of ERISA plans 
and protect plan participants should modified trust principles to determine 
when the arbitrary and capricious standard should apply, as identified by 
the Supreme Court.79 
4. Arbitrary and Capricious: As Applied to ERISA 
The arbitrary and capricious standard derives from pre-ERISA denial 
of benefits claims under the LMRA.80  Arbitrary and capricious was the 
prevailing standard of review of trustee responsibility when ERISA was 
enacted.81  Prior to ERISA’s enactment, the LMRA served as a regulator 
of union-negotiated pension trust administration.82  The LMRA did not 
expressly authorize suits brought against individual trustees and 
fiduciaries.83  For instance, the courts that apply the arbitrary and 
capricious standard to review whether a plan provision was structurally 
defective, which lead to a denial of benefits, does not review the 
misconduct of the individual administrator.84 
                                                                                                                                     
 75 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust As an Instrument of 
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 174–77 (1997) (discussing a variety of regulatory 
compliance trusts in federal and state law). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 512 (2010). 
 80 Kevin W. Beatty, A Decade Confusion: The Standard of Review for Erisa Benefit 
Denial Claims as Established by Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733, 734–36 (2000). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Bradley R. Duncan, Litigation Under ERISA: Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim 
Denials Under ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL 
L. REV. 986, 992 (1986). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 992–93. 
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The arbitrary and capricious standard has evolved from its original 
adoption.85  ERISA, while a comprehensive statute, does not specify a 
standard of review for a court to adopt when analyzing a plan administrator 
or trustee’s actions.86  Federal common law has evolved numerous legal 
principles to resolve ambiguities in ERISA’s provisions.87  Consequently, 
federal courts, by analogy, imported the LMRA arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review into ERISA’s standards.88  With the adoption of 
ERISA, Congress included provisions that imposed similar fiduciary 
duties to those under the LMRA.  At the time of ERISA’s adoption, 
however, one key difference set ERISA and LMRA duties and subsequent 
standard of review apart.89  While LMRA focuses on the structural defect 
of plan provisions in union-negotiated plans, ERISA focuses on securing 
plans “for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees,” and thus allows 
individual review of plan administrators’ actions.90 
As a result of filling ERISA gaps with trust principles, the arbitrary 
and capricious standard broadens the protective scope of a plan 
administrator acting under a conflict of interest.91  The Supreme Court, in 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, rather than finding that a conflict 
of interest automatically amounts to an arbitrary and capricious act,92 
                                                                                                                                     
 85 See Rud v. Liberty Life Assur. Co., 438 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006) (expanding on the 
sliding scale approach); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Emps.’ Pension Trust., 836 F.2d 1048 
(7th Cir. 1987) (pronouncing and applying the sliding scale approach). 
 86 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012). 
 87 See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010) (delineating factors a court must 
consider when analyzing whether a fiduciary’s acts are arbitrary and capricious); 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) (enumerating factors that warrant 
consideration in an arbitrary and capricious standard of review). 
 88 Michael S. Beaver, The Standard of Review in ERISA Benefits-Denial Cases 
after Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Revolution or Deja vu?, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 
1, 2 (1990); see, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-09 (1989) 
(stating that “ERISA does not set out the appropriate standard of review for action under 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit eligibility determinations. To fill this gap, federal 
courts have adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard developed under . . . 29 USC 
§ 186(c), a provision of the Labor Management  Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA).”). 
 89 Duncan, supra note 82, at 994. 
 90 Duncan, supra note 82, at 994. 
 91 See Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1052 (7th Cir. 1987) (adopting a sliding scale approach 
that “may be in effect a sliding scale of judicial review of [a] trustees’ decisions [-] more 
penetrating the greater is the suspicion of partiality, less penetrating the smaller that 
suspicion is.”). 
 92 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 145 (1989); see also Kevin 
W. Beatty, A Decade Confusion: The Standard of Review for Erisa Benefit Denial Claims 
as Established by Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733, 733–36 (2000) (explaining that 
Firestone did not follow the sliding scale approach in Van Boxel. Rather, Van Boxel’s 
sliding scale approach created an analysis that “may be in effect a sliding scale of judicial 
review of [a] trustees’ decisions [-] more penetrating the greater is the suspicion of 
partiality, less penetrating the smaller that suspicion is.” While a conflicted trustee may 
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accorded great deference to plan administrators based on trust principles 
if the plan accorded such deference upon the plan administrator.93  
Specifically, Firestone referred to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts to 
confer discretion upon a trustee and his exercise of power.94  Trust 
principles provide that a trustee’s exercise of power is not subject to a 
court’s control, except to prevent an abuse of discretion.95  Hence, fusing 
trust principles and the arbitrary and capricious standard protects a conflict 
of interest from automatically amounting to an abuse of discretion; the 
arbitrary and capricious standard, however, does not protect conflict that 
amount to an abuse of discretion.96 
With its origins in trust law, the arbitrary and capricious standard has 
left many unsettled issues for courts to address.  While Firestone resolved 
some issues concerning the application of this standard, it also created 
questions critical to a resolution of the practical implications of promoting 
plan creation and protecting plan participants.  Scholars have criticized the 
importation of the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard of review as 
applied to ERISA.97 The LMRA legislation provides safeguards that, for 
example, require submission of dispute in plan interpretation to an 
independent arbiter, which ERISA does not have.98  As a result, scholars 
have questioned the rationale behind applying a lenient standard of review 
to an administrator’s actions when no inherent safeguards are in place.99 
III. ERISA’S FEDERAL COMMON LAW: THE SUPREME COURT SETS 
CONTOURS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The Courts’ interpretation of ERISA has imposed several limitations 
on plan participants and beneficiaries by finding justification in creating 
uniform sets of laws that encourage employers to establish or sponsor 
employee benefit plans.100  The Supreme Court has followed a simplistic 
approach in fixing an employer-favoring standard of review.  In the past 
                                                                                                                                     
receive deference under a Firestone approach, a de novo review is the recommended 
standard for conflicting administrative decisions.). 
 93 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111–13. 
 94 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (2013)). 
 95 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (2013). See generally Brown v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining how scholars and 
the courts alike have used abuse of discretion and arbitrary and capricious interchangeably 
when referring to a deferential standard of review in ERISA cases.). 
 96 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 115 (2008)(explaining that a 
conflict that arises solely from having an employee trustee administrate the plan does not 
amount to an abuse of discretion). 
 97 Beatty, supra note 80, at 734–36. 
 98 Beatty, supra note 80, at 736. 
 99 Beatty, supra note 80, at 734–38. 
 100 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004). 
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twenty years, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of judicial review 
in the ERISA context.101  The following section highlights each Supreme 
Court case and its analysis in fashioning an employer-favoring standard of 
review. 
1. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch (1989) 
Before 1989, ERISA had failed to establish a standard of review for 
denial of benefits claims.102  In Firestone, however, the Supreme Court 
finally addressed the issue of ERISA plan interpretation, establishing the 
de novo standard of review as the default standard of judicial review in 
denial of benefit claims.103  Firestone held that “[c]onsistent with 
established principles of trust law, . . . a denial of benefits challenged under 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the 
benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to 
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”104  
Thus, Firestone is the starting point whenever analyzing an ERISA plan 
interpretation or judicial standard of review issue. 
The Firestone case was a class action by employees who sought 
severance benefits under one of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company’s 
ERISA qualified plans.105  The class action ensued because Firestone Tire 
and Rubber Company interpreted the plan language to deny the benefit 
claims, explaining that the reason for the claim did not in fact fall within 
the meaning of the plan, as they interpreted it.106 
The Court’s holding was expressly “limited to the appropriate 
standard of review in § 1132(a)(1)(B) actions challenging denials of 
benefits based on plan interpretations. [Firestone] express[ed] no view as 
to the appropriate standard of review for actions under other remedial 
provisions of ERISA.”107  The Court did not transplant principles of trust 
                                                                                                                                     
 101 See Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010)(holding that courts must consider 
trust law, the plan’s terms at issue, ERISA’s purpose and principles, and the Firestone 
precedent when determining the applicable standard of review); Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 
(holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review warrants the consideration of 
several factors); Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 145 (1989)(holding 
that the arbitrary and capricious judicial standard of review is required where a plan grants 
discretionary authority onto a fiduciary in the denial of benefits context). 
 102 Firestone, 489 US at 111. 
 103 Id. at 105–107 (deciding the meaning of the word “participant” in order to determine 
who can request plan information when severance benefits are denied under a termination 
pay plan governed by ERISA). 
 104 Id. at 115 (emphasis added). 
 105 Id. at 106. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108 (emphasis added). 
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law.108 Trust principles simply guided the Court to decide a reviewing 
standard for a remedial provision of ERISA, not all remedial provisions of 
ERISA.109  Therefore, applying an arbitrary and capricious standard did 
not mean that the plan administrator will prevail on the merits, but only 
that the plan administrator’s interpretation of the plan “will not be 
disturbed if reasonable.”110 
Thus, Firestone was not primarily concerned with the possibility of 
reducing protections to plan participants and beneficiaries.  The Court’s 
pronouncement provided employers and trustees a means of defeating the 
heightened de novo standard of review.111  The Court justified the adoption 
of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to trustees who act under 
the provisions of plan terms granting discretion by resting its analysis on 
general principles of trust law.112  The Court’s adoption of the arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review was based on the premise that ERISA 
was like any other contract, where deference is given to either party’s 
interpretation unless the contract itself redirects such deference to one 
party.113 
2. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn (2008) 
In 2008, the Supreme Court in Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn followed 
Firestone’s adoption of a highly deferential standard of review - arbitrary 
and capricious standard, where a plan grants discretionary authority to the 
plan administrator.114  Glenn also added to Firestone’s framework by 
requiring the consideration of external factors, such as the severity of a 
conflict of interest, when deciding whether an administrator’s acts were 
arbitrary and capricious.115  The Glenn Court stated that some factors 
merits consideration even under a deferential standard of review.116  Glenn 
did not broaden Firestone’s judicial review principles, but rather applied 
Firestone’s underlying trust law principles in order to promote plan 
participants and beneficiaries’ rights under a deferential standard of review 
in benefit denial cases. 
                                                                                                                                     
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 111. 
 111 Id. at 113–14. 
 112 Id. at 115. 
 113 Chad Baruch, The Widening Gyre: The Illusory Promise of Meaningful Judicial 
Review of ERISA Benefit Denials in the Fifth Circuit, 25 S.U. L. REV. 99, 112 (1997). 
 114 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 109 –10 (2008). 
 115 Id. at 110. 
 116 Id. at 115. 
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In Glenn, the petitioner served as an administrator and insurer of an 
ERISA-governed long-term disability insurance plan.117  The petitioner, as 
administrator, had discretionary authority to determine employees’ benefit 
claims and, as an insurer, funded payments for approved benefit claims.118  
An employee and plan participant, with a governmentally certified 
disability, was denied plan disability benefits.119  Even though the Social 
Security Administration granted her permanent disability, the 
administrator denied her claim for plan disability payments because the 
standard enumerated by the plan was stricter than the Social Security 
Administration’s definition.120 
The Court determined two issues: 1) whether a conflict of interest 
exists when a plan administrator both evaluates a benefits claim and pays 
for such claim; and 2) whether any such conflict of interest influences the 
“judicial review of a discretionary benefit determination.”121 Glenn held 
that a conflict of interest may exist when the plan is responsible for both 
determining whether a valid benefit claims exist and paying the claim.122  
The Court identified “that this dual role creates a conflict of 
interest . . . [and that] conflicts are but one factor among many that a 
reviewing judge must take into account.”123 
The Court did not want to abandon Firestone.124  No change, but an 
addition, to the deferential standard of review was made.125  Trust law was, 
again, the fundamental premise for keeping to high level of deference.126  
Glenn, while citing to the Restatement of Trusts, reasoned that a conflicted 
trustee’s claim determination does not switch the standard back to de novo 
review, but required that a reviewing judge take “account of the conflict 
when determining [] whether [a] trustee, substantively or procedurally, has 
abused his discretion.” 127  An arbitrary and capricious analysis based on a 
conflict of interest is fact sensitive.  Specifically, a conflict may exist, but 
a court will consider the extent of that conflict as one factor in determining 
whether the trustee abused his discretion.  Even when a conflict of interest 
is present, a deferential standard is warranted when the plan grants 
discretion to the trustee.128 
                                                                                                                                     
 117 Id. at 108. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 109. 
 120 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 109. 
 121 Id. at 110. 
 122 Id. at 108, 114. 
 123 Id. at 108, 116. 
 124 Id. at 116. 
 125 Id. at 115. 
 126 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 115. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 116-17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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In addition, other factors may be considered to determine whether a 
trustee has abused his discretion.129  While a conflict of interest was 
considered one factor, it was not the only one the court would consider.130  
Analogizing to administrative law judges, who take account of case-
specific factors to determine liability, Glenn appoints judges with the 
ultimate task of weighing all factors together.131 
Adding procedural rules to combat inadequacies in internal plan 
review of benefits denials was not an option for the Court due to a concern 
of added complexity, time, and expense on the court system and plan 
participants.132  The Court emphasized that “[b]enefits decisions arise in 
too many contexts, concern too many circumstances, and can relate in too 
many different ways to conflicts . . . for us to come up with a one-size-fits-
all procedural system that is likely to promote fair and accurate review.”133  
The Court further reasoned that Congress did not intend for the court to 
review the “lion’s share of ERISA plan claims denials . . . [for if] Congress 
intended such a system of review, . . . it would not have left to the courts 
the development of review standards but would have said more on the 
subject.”134 
Accordingly, Glenn creates a method for courts to decide, after 
considering external factors, whether a judicial standard of review should 
revert back to de novo when the plan enumerates discretionary authority 
upon the trustee.  After Glenn, courts consider numerous factors, such as 
a conflict of interest, when deciding whether a plan administrator’s actions 
are arbitrary and capricious.135  Glenn did not, however, enumerate the 
other numerous factors it approves for consideration.  Nonetheless, the 
implications of such judicial navigation results in an amplified 
investigation of the facts in any given ERISA case that grants discretion 
upon the plan administrator.  Therefore, instead of narrowly focusing on 
the four corners of the document, a court may widen its evidentiary 
horizon, which increases the possibility of finding that a plan 
administrator’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. 
3. Conkright v. Frommert (2010) 
In 2010, the Supreme Court, in Conkright v. Frommert, addressed 
whether a plan administrator’s second decision warranted deference after 
                                                                                                                                     
 129 Id. at 117. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 116–17.  
 133 Id. at 116. 
 134 Id. (citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989)). 
 135 Grams v. Am. Med. Instruments Holdings Long Term Disability Plan, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 89455, 6–7 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
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the first decision was considered unreasonable in the denial of benefits 
context.136  Conkright held that a single honest mistake in ERISA plan 
administration did not warrant a stricter standard of review.137  In other 
words, a single honest mistake, alone, does not warrant a de novo review 
when the plan grants discretionary authority up the plan administrator.138 
Conkright follows Firestone’s pronouncement of trust law as a guide 
to answer the ERISA standard of review questions.139  The Court 
announced, from integrating Firestone and Glenn, four elements to 
determine the proper standard of review in future ERISA judicial review 
cases.140  Namely, future courts would consider trust law, the plan’s terms 
at issue, ERISA’s purposes and principles, and the Firestone precedent.141 
Conkright entailed a corporation’s employees who left the 
corporation and received a lump-sum retirement benefit distribution, and 
then were later rehired.142  The plan administrators used a “phantom 
accounting” method to eliminate double retirement payments.143  The plan 
administrator then proposed another accounting method that did not 
calculate the present value of past distributions but instead used a fixed 
interest rate from the time of the distribution that accounted for the time 
value of money.144  A class of employees filed suit after their employer 
denied benefits based on the change in calculating methods.145  The 
Conkright Court recognized that the plan administrator’s initial choice in 
an inherently restrictive accounting method to the detriment of the plan 
participants was unreasonable.146  But the administrator’s decision was 
nonetheless labeled as an “honest mistake.”147  The Conkright Court 
reasoned, referring to its pronouncement in Glenn, that ERISA disfavors 
rules that create further complexity.148  The Court ultimately held that if a 
conflict of interest would “not strip a plan administrator of deference, it is 
difficult to see why a single honest mistake would require a different 
result.”149 
                                                                                                                                     
 136 Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 510–11 (2010)(addressed how to account for 
respondent’s past distribution in calculating current benefits to avoid paying the same 
benefit twice). 
 137 Id. at 509. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 512. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 513. 
 142 Conkright, 559 U.S. at 510. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 510-11. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 513. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Conkright, 559 U.S. at 519. 
 149 Id. at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
410 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 11:392 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit in the 
Western District of New York held that the plan administrator’s honest 
mistake was reasonable and thus not arbitrary and capricious.150  The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision 
after applying Firestone deference and explained that the plan 
administrator’s plan interpretation, while labeled an honest mistake, was 
unreasonable and thus arbitrary and capricious because the administrator’s 
plan interpretation was inconsistent with the plan language.151  The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals further noted that, even under a de novo review, 
the plan administrator’s honest mistake was unreasonable and thus 
arbitrary and capricious because it violated another ERISA provision.152  
Therefore, while an honest mistake does not strip an administrator of his 
Firestone deference, if such mistake is unreasonable, either through 
violating another ERISA provision or an irrational plan interpretation, the 
administrator’s act will be considered arbitrary and capricious. 
i. Breyer’s Dissent and Accompanying Scholars 
Justice Breyer, dissenting in Conkright, partially accepted 
Firestone’s holding while concerned with the majority’s unprecedented 
and erroneous conclusion of interpreting trust law in such an inflexible 
manner.153  Justice Breyer highlighted that the majority recognized trust 
law did “not resolve the specific issue before the Court.”154  Nonetheless, 
while having the opportunity to reference another body of law or to 
interpret trust law in such a manner to promote plan participants’ and 
beneficiaries’ interest, the Court fashioned a rule that required deference 
to a plan administrator’s second attempt at interpreting plan documents 
when he was found to have abused his discretion the first time he 
interpreted them.155 
Consistent with Justice Breyer’s intuition and reasoning, scholars 
have noted that Conkright, while claiming to base its decision on trust 
principles, failed to consider fundamental trust principles inconsistent with 
the analysis leading to Conkright’s holding.156  Trust law requires the 
                                                                                                                                     
 150 Paul Mollica, Frommert v. Conkright, EMPLOYMENT LAW BLOG (Dec. 26, 2013), 
http://www.employmentlawblog.info/2013/12/frommert-v-conkright-no-12-67-2d-cir-
dec-23-2013.shtml. 
 151 Frommert v. Conkright, 738 F.3d 522, 531 (2nd Cir. 2013). 
 152 Id. at 531. 
 153 Id. at 528–29 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
 154 Id. at 529 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 155 Id. at 528–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 156 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Langbein, supra note 59, at 1335–36 (explaining 
that key fundamental differences between ERISA’s purpose and trust law require a more 
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divestment of deference to a trustee when discretion is not exercised 
honestly and without bias.157  A trustee may exercise his discretion with 
bias by making multiple erroneous interpretations, even if in good faith.158  
Not only bad faith, but also a plan administrator’s incompetence, can serve 
as sufficient reason to divest him of deference under trust principles.159 
Conkright reasons that ERISA’s purpose far outweighs the addition 
of further complexity to protect plan participants because a careful balance 
must be maintained to protect plan creation. 160  Justice Breyer emphasized 
that preserving the reasons on which ERISA is based – in part, the 
enlargement and protection of plan participants’ and beneficiaries’ rights, 
are important to implement ERISA’s purpose.161  Building on principles 
to promote the interest of efficiency, uniformity, and reduced litigation 
cost, while noting the careful balance courts have striven to strike between 
ensuring unbiased and prompt enforcement of rights and the 
encouragement of creating plans, the Court, however, justifies its 
pronouncement of broad deference to administrators on one side of the 
balance – promoting efficiency, predictability, and uniformity.162 
IV. THE SPLIT 
Since Firestone, the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have 
disagreed on the extent to which the arbitrary and capricious standard 
applies to plan interpretation outside of the denial of benefits context.163  
On opposite sides of the Firestone spectrum sits Tibble v. Edison 
International of the Ninth Circuit and John Blair Commc’n Profit Sharing 
Plan v. Telemundo Group of the Second Circuit.164 
                                                                                                                                     
flexible and causual adoption of trust princples and other legal bodies of law to guide 
ERISA instead of a inflexible default adoption of trust principles). 
 157 Jessica M. Standish, Michael D. Reilly & Jeffrey L. Gingold, CONFRONTING BANS 
ON DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES IN ERISA PLANS, 191, 199,  available at http://www.erisapros
.com/pdfs/12_Standish.pdf (last visited May 5, 2015). 
 158 Id. 
 159 See Langbein, supra note 59, at 1317. 
 160 Conkright, 559 U.S. at 517. 
 161 Id. at 528–29 (Breyer, S., dissenting). 
 162 Id. at 518. 
 163 See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013) (allowing the broad 
application of the arbitrary and capricious to apply to all plan interpretation); Hunter v. 
Caliber System, Inc., 220 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the arbitrary and capricious 
standard applied outside the denial of benefits context); Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 
(3d Cir. 1995) (applying the arbitrary and capricious to the breach of fiduciary context); 
John Blair Communications, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, Inc. Profit 
Sharing Plan, 26 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that Firestone clearly disallows the 
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard outside the denial of benefits context). 
 164 Tibble, 711 F.3d 1061; John Blair, 26 F.3d 360. 
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Each of the abovereferenced circuits hold a distinct perspective 
composing a collage-like jurisprudence.  John Blair adopts a strict reading 
of Firestone and applies the arbitrary and capricious standard to denial of 
benefits claims only.165  At the opposite end, Tibble proposes an arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review for all remedial ERISA provisions and 
any other plan interpretation provisions.166  The Third and Sixth Circuits 
agree that an arbitrary and capricious standard should apply outside of the 
denial of benefits context, but reject the extreme positions of the Ninth and 
Second Circuits.167  The Third and Sixth Circuits do not define how far the 
arbitrary and capricious standard should apply outside of the denial of 
benefits context.168  Thus, broadly categorized, the Ninth and Second 
Circuits sit at opposite sides while the Sixth and Third Circuits sit 
somewhere in between the Ninth and Second Circuits. 
1. Strict Construction: The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Does 
Not Apply to All Plan Interpretation Claims Outside of the Denial of 
Benefits Context. 
i. Second Circuit - John Blair Commc’n Profit Sharing Plan v. 
Telemundo Group and Frommert v. Conkright. 
The Second Circuit, in John Blair, decided whether the arbitrary and 
capricious standard applies outside of the denial of benefits context.169  
The court held that the arbitrary and capricious standard does not apply 
outside the benefits denial context.170  It is important to note, however, that 
John Blair was the first case decided after Firestone that faithfully 
followed Firestone’s limited standing. Since Firestone, the Second Circuit 
has continued to uphold John Blair’s legacy, while the Supreme Court has 
decided two cases speaking, in part, to judicial standard of review in 
ERISA claims on plan interpretation.171 
John Blair involved a suit by the John Blair company plan (JBCP) 
and its members against another plan, the Telemundo plan (TP), as a 
                                                                                                                                     
 165 John Blair, 26 F.3d at 369–70. 
 166 Tibble, 711 F.3d at 1077. 
 167 Hunter, 220 F.3d at 711; Moench, 62 F.3d at 565–66. 
 168 See Hunter, 220 F.3d at 711(applying arbitrary and capricious standard outside the 
denial of benefits context but not stating how far it should be applied); Moench, 62 F.3d at 
565–66 (applying arbitrary and capricious standard to fiduciary breaches but not stating 
what other context warrant the arbitrary and capricious analysis). 
 169 John Blair, 26 F.3d at 369–70. 
 170 Id. (emphasis added). 
 171 Conkright arose from the 2nd Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the 2nd Circuit’s 
carving exception to ERISA’s remedial provisions would not be affirmed in that instance. 
But, the Supreme Court did not repudiate John Blair in Conkright. Conkright v. Frommert, 
559 U.S. 506, 512–14 (2010). 
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committee and individual members of the committee.172  The JBCP was 
reorganized to include new members and funds from another plan.173  The 
process entailed transferring assets from a plan that was reorganized into 
the JBCP.174  During the re-organization of the JBCP, TP transferred assets 
from the reorganized plan into JBCP but failed to transfer the appreciation 
of those assets.175  As a result, JBCP claimed that TP violated its fiduciary 
duty. 
In declining to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard outside of 
the denial of benefits context, John Blair kept to Firestone’s 
pronouncement – the arbitrary and capricious standard, in Firestone, only 
applied to the denial of benefits context.176  The Second Circuit strictly 
construed Firestone’s holding.177  John Blair justified its narrow 
interpretation of Firestone on the same idea identified in Moench v. 
Robertson.178  A Third Circuit case weighing in on the split discussed 
below in Section III explains that all ERISA remedial actions are not the 
same, and as such, all ERISA remedial actions should not utilize the same 
standard of judicial review.179  In addition, John Blair justifies its holding 
by identifying that Firestone concerned a denial of benefits case and did 
not speak to other ERISA remedial actions where the plan grants 
interpretative powers upon the plan administrator.180 
Moreover, the Second Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court, 
in Frommert v. Conkright, continues to uphold the John Blair legacy.181  
In Frommert, on appeal, the plaintiffs brought two claims: that the plan 
administrator plan interpretation 1) was an unreasonable interpretation 
under a denial of benefits claim, and 2) violated an ERISA notice 
provision.182 Frommert explicitly declined to address what standard of 
review applied outside the denial of benefits context.  Specifically, 
Frommert stated that determining whether an ERISA notice violation 
stemming from an “interpretation of the [plan] . . . , is subject to review 
under a de novo or abuse of discretion standard.  We decline to answer 
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that question here . . . .”183  The Frommert decision recaptures the Second 
Circuit’s stance on determining the standard of review for plan 
interpretation that are beyond the denial of benefits context.  In conclusion, 
John Blair and Frommert stand for the proposition that Firestone 
deference applies to denial of benefit claims and that any other claim 
outside of the denial of benefits context requires a higher court’s review 
to determine the appropriate standard of review.184 
2. Liberal Construction: The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard 
Applies Outside of the Denial of Benefits Context. 
i. Ninth Circuit - Tibble v. Edison Int’l (2013) 
The Ninth Circuit, in Tibble, decided to what extent the arbitrary and 
capricious standard should apply to a plan administrator or trustee’s plan 
interpretation outside of the benefit claims context.185  Broadly interpreting 
Firestone and its progeny, Tibble held that a high deferential standard of 
review applied to all plan interpretations beyond denial of benefit 
claims.186  Under this analysis, the Tibble court applied Firestone 
deference in evaluating a plan administrator’s alleged breach of fiduciary 
duty.187 
The facts of Tibble entailed a suit by beneficiaries against the 
employer’s benefit plan administrator for allegedly managing the plan 
imprudently in a self-interested fashion.188  The employer provided six 
investment options in the defined contribution plan,189 which entitled 
retirees only to the value of their own investment accounts.190  Among the 
other financial options to choose from, the company had retail-class 
mutual funds, which had higher administrative fees than alternatives 
available only to institutional investors.191  Further, the addition of a wider 
array of mutual funds also introduced a practice known as revenue sharing 
into the mix.192  Under this dynamic, certain mutual funds collected fees 
out of fund assets and disbursed them to the plan’s service provider.193  
The employer, Edison, in turn received a credit on its invoices from that 
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provider.194  Beneficiaries objected to the inclusion of retail-class mutual 
funds, specifically claiming that their inclusion had been imprudent, and 
that the practice of revenue sharing had violated both the plan document 
and conflict of interest provision.195  The beneficiaries also claimed that 
offering unitized stock funds, money market-style investments, and 
mutual funds were imprudent.196 
The plan document stated that the company would pay the 
administrative cost.197  By providing more investment options to the 
beneficiaries, the plan became more expensive to administer and Edison 
availed itself of revenue sharing with the third party administrator of 
investment options for the plan.198  Under the agreement, the mutual fund 
would transfer a portion of their fees to the plan’s third party service 
provider’s account.199  The revenue would reimburse the third party 
service provider, thus Edison would receive a credit on its bill from the 
third party servicer. 200  Plan administrators later amended the plan to 
include discretionary authority to interpret the plan’s language, and the 
Tibble court addressed the interpretive issues of whether the pre-
amendment version of the plan allowed offsets or revenue sharing.201 
Tibble found three main reasons for holding that Firestone deference 
applies beyond plan interpretation in benefit denial claims and to fiduciary 
duties.202  In identifying and distinguishing the current split on the scope 
of deferential review, first, the Tibble court distinguished John Blair, 
which holds that Firestone deference is generally limited to denial of 
benefit claims.203  Next, Tibble reasoned that trust law dictates the 
appropriate standard of review.204  Lastly, Tibble reasons that its “across-
the-board” deference derives from Conkright’s emphasis on promoting 
plan creation.205 
Tibble identified strong parallels between Conkright and John 
Blair.206  The Conkright decision arose from the Second Circuit, from 
which the decision in John Blair originated.  While the Conkright court 
did not expressly repudiate John Blair’s holding, it nonetheless reasoned 
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that exceptions to ERISA were disfavored.207  Conkright repudiated the 
Second Circuit’s exception to Firestone deference by forgiving a first-time 
good-faith mistake by a plan administrator or trustee.208  Therefore, Tibble 
reasoned that anything resembling a carved-out exception to ERISA 
deferential review is unwarranted.209 
Second, Tibble reasoned that trust law controls the analysis in 
deciding the standard of judicial review.210  While acknowledging that 
Firestone’s holding was limited to denial of benefit claims and no other 
ERISA remedial provisions, the Tibble court noted that trust law was a 
founding principle in Firestone’s analysis.211  Thus, using trust principles, 
which Firestone found appropriate solely for its denial of benefit claims 
analysis, Tibble presumed that trust law is the appropriate body of law to 
control the standard of review for any and all plan interpretation 
concerning ERISA. 212 
Lastly, Tibble justified its “across-the-board” deference by 
identifying Conkright’s emphasis on the careful balance between 
promoting plan creation and protecting plan participant’s rights.213  
Following the spirit of Conkright, Tibble was likewise more concerned 
with one side of the balance — promoting efficiency, predictability, and 
uniformity to encourage the creation of ERISA plans.214  Like Conkright, 
therefore, Tibble completely disregarded the equitable standards that 
ensure unbiased and prompt enforcement of plan participants’ and 
beneficiary rights – the other side of the balance.215 
ii. Sixth Circuit - Hunter v. Caliber Sys. Inc. (2000) 
The Sixth Circuit, in Hunter v. Caliber Sys. Inc, decided whether the 
lower court erred by applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to a 
plan administrator plan interpretation outside of the denial of benefit 
claims context.216  Similar to Moench v. Robertson, Hunter held that the 
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard applied beyond the 
typical review of denial of benefits claims.217  In holding that the district 
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court did not err in using the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, 
Hunter based its decision on Firestone and trust law principles.218 
Hunter involved a suit by plan participants who claimed that the plan 
administrator failed to perform several fiduciary duties.219  Plan 
participants were denied lump sum distributions and delayed the 
opportunity to sell company stock after a spin-off from defendant’s parent 
company occurred.220  An amendment to the plan was made.  The 
amendment created a fiction - that plan participants’ employment 
continued during the spin-off period of the subsidiary company from the 
parent, when in-fact they were not.221  The court affirmed in favor of the 
plan administrators under an arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review.222 
While acknowledging that the wholesale importation of trust 
principles into ERISA is unwarranted, Hunter announced that the arbitrary 
and capricious standard is appropriate outside the denial of benefits 
context.223  The Sixth Circuit added that its circuit precedent, as consistent 
with Firestone, required an inquiry of whether the plan administrator’s 
interpretation was arbitrary and capricious, made in bad faith, or otherwise 
contrary to law.224  Hunter recognized that Firestone stood for the limited 
premise that the standard of review for denial of benefit claims, and not 
any other remedial ERISA provision, is arbitrary and capricious when the 
plan grants discretion upon the trustee or plan administrator.225  
Nonetheless, the Hunter court modeled its analysis after Firestone and 
Moench and based its decision to apply the arbitrary and capricious 
standard outside the benefits claims context on language and principles of 
trust law.226  Hunter is different from Tibble’s expansive position because 
Hunter did not state the extent to which the arbitrary and capricious 
standard should apply outside the denial of benefits context.227  Thus, 
Hunter stands for the proposition that the arbitrary and capricious standard 
should apply outside of the denial of benefits context but exactly how far 
from the denial of benefits context is unclear.228 
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iii. Third Circuit - Moench v. Robertson (1995) 
The Third Circuit, in Moench v. Robertson, considered whether a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim warranted an arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review.229  Specifically, Moench considered the extent to 
which fiduciaries of an Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) may be liable 
when investing solely in the employer’s common stock and when the plan 
terms provide that the primary purpose of the ESOP is to invest in 
employer’s stock.230  The subsidiary and accompanying issue was whether 
a breach of fiduciary duty claim warranted an arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review.231  Moench held that while the arbitrary and capricious 
standard should not be mechanically applied to all ERISA claims, 
Firestone’s mode of analysis and reference to trust law warrants the 
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard in breach of fiduciary 
claims.232 
Moench involved a bank holding company that established an ESOP 
for its employees.233  Throughout a three-year period, the bank’s common 
stock fell approximately 95%.234  Federal regulatory agencies expressed 
their concern over the bank’s financial stability, but the plan administrator 
continued to invest in the ESOP.235  The bank ultimately filed for 
bankruptcy.236  Former bank employees who participated in the ESOP 
brought suit against the bank committee, while not suing the plan trustee 
nor the plan sponsor, who was the bank.237 
Moench, as in Hunter and Tibble, recognized that Firestone’s 
holding was limited to the applicable standard of review under denial of 
benefits claims and not other remedial measures under ERISA.238  The 
Moench court justified its holding on Firestone’s dependence on trust 
principles.239  Firestone’s analysis, while limited to benefit claims, was 
pertinent to all claims challenging a fiduciaries performance under 
ERISA.240  Moench further explained that Congress’s intent to invoke trust 
law as a guide to ERISA is consistent with its decision because they do 
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not pronounce that every remedial ERISA provision warrants an arbitrary 
and capricious review.241 
Therefore, the Moench court’s perspective was that denial of benefit 
claims, breach of fiduciary duty claims, and possibly other remedial 
claims, but not all ERISA remedial claims, warranted a deferential 
standard of review.242  While Tibble holds that the arbitrary and capricious 
standard applies without limits to any and all plan interpretation where the 
plan grants discretion, Moench holds that some but not all instances of plan 
interpretation warrants an arbitrary and capricious standard.243  Moench 
suggests that certain facts, but not all facts, warrant an arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review where a plan grants discretion.244  The 
Moench court reasoned that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review 
cannot simply apply to all ERISA remedial claims because each are 
comprised of dissimilar facts and circumstances that may require another 
standard of review.245  Thus, by inference, one can interpret Moench to 
mean that all ERISA remedial claims are not the same and those claims 
that are similar in fact and circumstance, like a denial of benefit claim, 
warrant one type of standard for judicial review, but not one standard 
should apply to all ERISA remedial claims. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The inconsistency among the circuits creates serious practical 
implications for ERISA civil cases.  The retirement pensions system, and 
how courts interpret ERISA, has an impact on 1) how we save; 2) the 
fluctuation of our capital markets; and, among others 3) governmental 
responsibility through social security — fundamental elements of our 
nation’s financial security.  The standard of judicial review and how courts 
evaluate whether a violation of an ERISA remedial provision has occurred 
implicates an outcome determinative analysis.  The Ninth Circuit has 
decided that any and all plan interpretation, beyond denial of benefits 
claims, should be accorded Firestone deference if granted by the plan. 
Plan interpretation includes a myriad of plan administrative duties 
with varying degrees of implications on the plan participant and 
beneficiary.  For example, the area of plan interpretation includes: 1) 
denial of benefits claim; 2) the implementation of administrative rules to 
the plan and what can and cannot be added by the administrator; 3) 
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determining what is adequate notice to plan participants;246 4) the scope of 
plan administrators’ fact determination in any such claim under the plan; 
5) the scope of medical determinations; 6) determining who is a plan 
beneficiary when a state does not legally recognize same-sex marriage; 7) 
setting the scope of fiduciary liability; 8) interpreting what formula will 
control the benefit calculation;247 and 9) interpreting benefit waivers.248 
ERISA explains that a court’s interpretation must carry out its 
purpose – to protect plan participants and beneficiaries and promote plan 
creation.  This comment posits a solution to keep the careful balance 
between participant protection and plan promotion.  While this comment 
agrees with one aspect of the Ninth Circuit — that all plan interpretation 
should be accorded Firestone deference if the plan provides discretion — 
this comment does not adopt the Second Circuit’s restrictive reading of 
Firestone.  Instead, reflecting the current judicial trend in upholding 
deference for plan administrators when the plan grants discretion, this 
Comment recommends that a court be required to adopt broader remedial 
safeguards increasing the scope of evidencitary review by analyzing any 
and all relevant factors that may capture and demonstrate an arbitrary and 
capricious act. 
1. Weighing in on the Split 
The Sixth and Third Circuits’ holdings reflect the model for added 
remedial safeguards that heighten the likelihood of finding an arbitrary and 
capricious act while sustaining the careful balance between plan creation 
and plan participant protection.249  The Ninth Circuit covers plan 
administrators with a protective veil concerning any and all plan 
interpretation, so long as the plan grants discretion, without regard to the 
rights and interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.250   The Second 
Circuit takes a strict constructionist approach refusing to expand the 
arbitrary and capricious standard reducing judicial economy.251 
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The Second Circuit has failed to recognize that an analytical skeleton 
is necessary to encompass other remedial provisions.252  By rigidly 
construing Firestone’s language to apply to the denial of benefits context 
only, the Second Circuit suggest that each and every plan interpretation 
provision in ERISA, if not already considered by the court, should be 
considered individually to determine which standard of review should 
apply.253  Courts would be burdened if they had to consider all cases of 
plan interpretation individually and delineate a rule for each in deciding 
which standard of review applies.  Such result would contradict ERISA’s 
purpose which seeks to add simplicity to the judicial avenues created by 
ERISA in an effort to promote plan creation.  Therefore, under the Second 
Circuit’s approach, courts would be flooded with the responsibility of 
deciding which standard of judicial review applies to each and every 
instance of ERISA plan interpretation, increasing litigation and adding 
complexity to the administration of ERISA plans. 
The Second Circuit recognizes implications of an across-the-board 
deference approach.  In both John Blair and Formmert, the court found 
unsettling the idea that one standard of review would apply to any and all 
areas of plan interpretation within ERISA simply because the plan grants 
discretionary authority upon the plan administrator.  John Blair and 
Formmert were concerned about the implications that approach would 
have upon plan participants and beneficiaries.  Both were concerned that 
discretionary language will covertly cover plan administrators’ action with 
the arbitrary and capricious standard from a court’s radar.254  Thus, the 
Second Circuit identifies a critical aspect of plan interpretation – that all 
areas of plan interpretation within ERISA are not the same, and thus 
should not implicate a default standard of review without a court’s 
approval.255  John Blair explained that several acts of plan interpretation 
implicate different fiduciary standards, thus warranting different levels of 
deference.256  Specifically, John Blair stated that in challenging a trustee 
in a denial of benefit context, “the issue is not whether the trustees have 
sacrificed the interests of the beneficiaries as a class in favor of some third 
party’s interests, but whether the trustees have correctly balanced the 
interests of present claimants against the interests of future claimants[.]”  
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As a result, the circumstance would dictate the appropriate level of 
discretion.257 
The Ninth Circuit, however, has taken a simplistic but dangerous 
approach.258  The Ninth Circuit suggest that the arbitrary and capricious 
standard should apply to all ERISA plan interpretation provisions.  The 
Ninth Circuit, in Tibble, reasoned that the arbitrary and capricious standard 
is derived from trust principles, which has continuously served as the gap 
filler for ERISA, and hence justify its application to all ERISA plan 
interpretation provisions.259  Perhaps the Ninth Circuit should not kill the 
proverbial birds with one stone. 
Tibble’s across-the-board discretion to plan administrators and 
trustees leaves a number of new issues unanswered.  Tibble grants 
deference to plan administrator and trustees on issues concerning plan 
interpretation.  But Tibble does not set out rules, standards, or parameters 
for such fiduciaries’ interpretation.  One is left with the proposition that a 
plan administrator has uninhibited interpretative discretion, if the plan 
grants some discretion, so long as such interpretation does not amount to 
an abuse of discretion.  Given the expansive powers granted upon plan 
administrators interpreting the plan, Tibble did not adopt remedial 
safeguards in light of increasing trustees’ powers, nor define what would 
amount to an abuse of discretion.  Tibble’s blanket discretion would now 
include issues that historically received a heightened standard of review.260  
Tibble proposes that all plan interpretation claims must receive an arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review.261  The deferential standard of review, 
among others, would apply to health care plans, disability plans, accidental 
death plans, and certain provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.262 
While Tibble takes an across-the-board deference approach, ERISA 
does not. ERISA has different rules for different plans and different 
circumstances affecting plan participants and beneficiary rights.  For 
example, ERISA’s strict participation, vesting, and funding requirements 
apply to defined contribution and defined benefit plans, but does not apply 
to welfare benefit plans.263  Consequently, Tibble has provided plan 
administrators with an unfettered powerful tool to pursue the unannounced 
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but realistic practicalities of trust administration, like insurance – a 
dedicated unwillingness to payout claims. 
As a result, Tibble increases the strain between other limiting ERISA 
provisions and its across-the-board deference standard. Several ERISA 
provisions, such as the enumeration of Congress’s intent, limit plan 
sponsors or drafters from creating self-serving clauses.264  As such,  self-
serving clauses that defeat Firestone’s nonderential review, a prerequisite 
to obtaining deferential review, arguably come in conflict with fiduciaries’ 
duties and ERISA’s purpose of promoting plan participant’s and 
beneficiaries’ interest.  The across-the-board deference fails to account for 
essential remedial safeguards necessary to effectuate the balance sought 
by Congress. 
Moreover, the Sixth and Third Circuits hold that neither an across-
the-board approach, as in the Ninth Circuit, or a strict reading of Firestone, 
as in the Second Circuit, controls the analysis to determine the standard of 
review when a plan grants discretion upon a trustee.265  The Sixth and 
Third Circuits fall in the middle.266  They suggest that external factors like 
the nature of the conflict of interest or whether a trustee’s act was in bad 
faith warrant consideration.  The Sixth and Third Circuits do not identify 
a laundry list of factors, suggesting that the responsibility of identifying 
those factors are left to the reviewing court.  They are simply silent on the 
issue of what factors warrant consideration but suggest that the 
consideration of external factors and the scope of evidentiary review may 
be liberalized. 
The Sixth Circuit proscribed the wholesale importation of trust 
principles to all ERISA plan interpretation claims but accept that the 
arbitrary and capricious standard should be applied outside the denial of 
benefits context.267  The Third Circuit followed, in Moench, by 
recognizing that “the arbitrary and capricious standard of review allowed 
in Firestone should not be applied mechanically to all ERISA claims.”268  
Essentially, the Third and Sixth Circuit’s concern was the issue of 
increased deference for plan administrators who were granted discretion 
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by the plan and the lack of similar increased protections for plan 
participants and beneficiaries.  Respectively, the Moench and Hunter 
holdings hinted to remedial safeguards in reviewing a plan administrator’s 
actions; both courts considered factors such as bad faith or acts otherwise 
contrary to law to determine whether the administrator’s acts were 
arbitrary and capricious. 
Ultimately, The Second Circuit is well behind its time, while the 
Ninth Circuit is well ahead of its time without regard to beneficiary and 
plan participant rights and without adopting parallel remedial safeguard in 
light of aggrandizing administrator interpretative powers.  The Sixth and 
Third Circuits have taken a step in the right direction by considering 
external factors when determining whether a trustee’s actions were 
arbitrary and capricious.  Conclusively, the Sixth and Third Circuits come 
closer to reaching a healthy balance — the promotion of employer 
sponsored ERISA plans and the protection of plan participants and 
beneficiaries. 
Therefore, the next step is to create an analytical framework that fits 
within the structure of Firestone’s progeny and that reflects the healthy 
balance of promoting plan creation and protecting plan participants 
through added remedial provisions and factors.  In order to resolve this 
problem and recalibrate the balance between plan creation and participant 
protection, remedial safeguards must be present.  If a court is to adopt an 
across-the-board deference approach, as propounded in Tibble, the 
adoption of remedial safeguards, in the form of enlarging the scope of 
evidentiary review to consider any and all factors that assist the court in 
finding an arbitrary and capricious act are warranted.  Specifically, in 
reviewing whether plan interpretation was arbitrary and capricious, the 
court could, among others, consider the following factors: 1) whether the 
plan administrator failed to account for factors necessary for an objective 
interpretation; 2) whether the plan administrator’s explanation for the 
denial is legitimate and founded upon a reasonable interpretation of the 
plan; 3) whether the interpretation has a rational connection with the facts 
influencing such interpretation; 4) whether previous interpretation of same 
provision under the same circumstance are consistent; or 5) whether 
external factors, such as an employer’s business plan, influenced the 
administrator to interpret the plan differently, albeit objectively. 
2. Where the Supreme Court Missed its Mark 
ERISA was enacted to remedy defects in the private retirement 
system.  Specifically, Congress explicitly sought to create and initiate the 
creation of adequate remedial safeguards with respect to administration 
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and operation of ERISA plans.269  To fully comply with Congress’s intent, 
ERISA’s multifaceted and complex composition requires more than an 
across-the-board deference approach, as found in Tibble.  While courts 
have recently landed on the side of simplicity,270 the imbalance between 
protecting individual pension rights and promoting the creation of private 
employer-sponsored retirement plans is not justified.  The benefit of 
cloaking fiduciaries with across-the-board deference, without increasing 
procedural safeguards, is unsuitable in light of Congressional intent and 
does not outweigh the anticipated cost. 
ERISA depends on the delicate balance between maintaining and 
promoting the creation of such plans through incentives and safeguards for 
plan sponsors and the protections afforded to plan participants and 
beneficiaries.  Through enactments and amendments, Congress intended 
an equal balance to protect plan participants’ and beneficiaries’ interest.  
Yet, the Supreme Court’s decisions add to the imbalance by continuing to 
make ERISA an employer-favoring statute favoring employers over 
employees.271  The arbitrary and capricious standard of review has 
solidified an illusion of adequate remedial safeguards.  In reality, the 
arbitrary and capricious standard cloaks fiduciaries and trustees with a 
delicate, though resilient, veil of indemnity creating a culture of lacking 
consequences for fiduciaries and trustees to the impactful detriment of 
plan participants and beneficiaries. 
First, the Firestone Court failed to consider whether ERISA’s 
purpose would be better served by allowing plan drafters the ability to 
bypass the de novo standard.272  Scholars have noted that granting a plan 
drafter the ability to mold the plan to his sole interest contradicts Congress’ 
purpose to restrict private autonomy.273  Congress imposed trust principles 
to inhibit plan administrator’s unilateral decision making and to promote 
the plan participants’ and beneficiaries’ interest.274  Firestone made de 
novo review the default standard for reviewing a plan interpretation issue 
but did not consider whether plan construction that defeats de novo review 
is consistent with ERISA’s purpose and provisions. 
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The practical consequence of Firestone and its progeny is evident in 
Tibble.  In order to fall within the arbitrary and capricious standard, plan 
administrators or trustees simply need to amend plan language to prescribe 
discretion.275  Now, at least in the Ninth Circuit, plan administrators will 
be cloaked by the arbitrary and capricious standard without added checks 
and balances.276  The Ninth Circuit’s across-the-board approach, coupled 
with Conkright, may further encourage plan administrators to adopt 
unreasonable interpretations of plans initially, in anticipation that a second 
bite at the apple will ensue if their first interpretation is questioned or held 
unreasonable.277  This, among other concerns, undermines the prompt 
resolution of disputes over benefits, driving up litigation cost or 
discouraging employees from challenging a plan administrators’ decision 
all together. 
Next, Glenn did not want to abandon Firestone.278  No change, but 
an addition, to the deferential standard of review was made.279  Trust law 
was, once again, the fundamental premise for establishing high 
deference.280  Glenn, while citing to the Restatement of Trusts, reasoned 
that a conflicted trustee’s claim determination does not switch the standard 
back to de novo review.281  The Court, however, required that a reviewing 
judge take “account of the conflict when evaluating determining whether 
the trustee, subjectively or procedurally, has abused his discretion.”282  
Specifically, a conflict is but one factor in determining whether the trustee 
abused his discretion and does not automatically raise judicial scrutiny 
above the arbitrary and capricious standard.283 
Glenn failed to explicitly state what other factors may be considered 
to determine whether a trustee has abused his discretion.284  Glenn 
emphasized that “[b]enefits decisions arise in too many contexts, concern 
too many circumstances, and can relate in too many different ways to 
conflicts . . . for us to come up with a one-size-fits-all procedural system 
that is likely to promote fair and accurate review.”285  While the Court 
promoted a method of review that increased the evidentiary scope to 
consider “all the factors” necessary in examining a possible arbitrary and 
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capricious act, it failed to require or structure what “all the factors” meant 
in for concerns of making adopting a bright line rule.  Hence, one is left 
with the following questions: 1) does “all of the factors” mean any and all 
factors that can help a court determine whether an arbitrary and capricious 
act exist; 2) should the court afford more weight to some factors over 
others; 3) does “all of the factors” mean that the judge can only consider 
those factors presented by counsel or can a judge consider other factors 
sua sponte; or 4) does “all of the factors” only mean the factors 
establishing the conflict of interest?  Therefore, further clarity is necessary 
to determine the breath of factors that may be considered by a reviewing 
judge. 
Furthermore, the Conkright Court continued to recognize the unclear 
state of trust law with regard to the question of trustee deference, but 
nonetheless faithfully followed the spirit of trust principles.286  The 
Conkright court solidified its faithfulness to trust law even when it 
recognized that trust law was originally intended to serve only as a starting 
point, from which the court would then determine whether sufficient 
evidence supports departure from common trust law requirements.287  The 
Court explained that trust law warrants departure from common-law trust 
deference “when reason indicates that the trustee will not exercise their 
discretion fairly, by showing, for example, that the trustee previously acted 
in bad faith.”288  One good-faith mistake does not divest the trustee of 
discretion.289  In effect, a good-faith mistake, like the conflict addressed in 
Glenn, must now be weighed as one factor in determining whether the 
trustee or plan administrator abused his discretion. 
Conkright explains that a conflict of interest alone does not amount 
to an arbitrary and capricious finding and neither does a single honest 
mistake alone.  Conkright, however does not answer whether those two 
factors coupled together amount to an arbitrary and capricious finding; 
nor does Conkright explain what factors together or alone amount to an 
arbitrary and capricious finding.  While a contrary and valid view is that 
most ERISA plan interpretation claims are fact-sensitive, Conkright 
nonetheless fails to guide courts in deciding what factors, beyond an 
honest mistake or conflict, should be afforded weight and considered. 
For these reasons, Firestone and its progeny leave many questions 
unanswered in light of the recent Ninth Circuit pronouncement in Tibble.  
In order to carry out ERISA’s purpose to protect plan participants and 
beneficiaries and promote plan creation, a solution must adopt ERISA’s 
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overall purpose.  The ideal solution keeps the balance at a horizontal 
equilibrium. 
3. A Proposed Solution 
This Comment asserts that the ideal arbitrary and capricious analysis 
identifies ERISA’s complexity to allow the enlargement of evidentiary 
scope to consider any and all factors that may assist a judge in deciding 
whether an administrator’s plan interpretation is arbitrary and capricious.  
The consideration of any and all factors to assist an arbitrary and 
capricious determination does not contradict Firestone and its progeny’s 
standard.  This essential approach warrants a method of review that will 
impose adequate remedial safeguards upon plan administrators and plan 
participants to uphold the careful balance Congress envisioned.  As the 
judicial pendulum swings towards increased discretion for plan 
administrators, this comment asserts that courts have not likewise 
increased remedial safeguards for plan participants and beneficiaries. 
This Comment proposes staying within the high-threshold arbitrary 
and capricious standard, as applied to all plan interpretation claims when 
the plan grants discretionary authority upon the administrator, while 
including remedial safeguards that enlarge the evidentiary scope upon 
review of an administrator’s plan interpretation.  Analogous to the analysis 
in Firestone, Glenn, and Conkright, an adapted importation of trust 
principles to the arbitrary and capricious standard would include the use 
of factors to increase the possibility of determining that an administrator’s 
acts are arbitrary and capricious.290  The more factors one considers, the 
more likely an administrator’s acts could be found to be arbitrary and 
capricious.  For example, in Glenn, in evaluating whether an abuse of 
discretion existed, the Court required the consideration of external factors, 
such as a conflict of interest, thus inferring that other factors merit 
consideration.291  In, Conkright, the Court, in determining whether the plan 
administrator abused his discretion, considered the factor of acting in bad 
faith.292 
In light of the lack of uniformity on the judicial standard of review 
in plan interpretation cases, the Supreme Court of the United States should 
fashion a rule with remedial safeguards that require judges to consider any 
and all factors that assist a court in determining whether a plan 
administrator’s act is arbitrary and capricious.  Requiring the court to 
consider any and all factors decreases the judiciary’s discretion, but also 
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decreases appellate review as the judge would leave no stone unturned.  
Thus, to cure the current imbalance and assist courts in finding what type 
of interpretative discretion is too much discretion or arbitrary and 
capricious, the factors should include, among others, incompetence, 
conflict of interest, ulterior motives or surrounding circumstances 
independent from a conflict of interest, and bad faith. 
Moreover, another remedial safeguard may include the help of an 
independent arbiter in the appeals process.  The independent arbiter can 
interpret plan language and determine whether the administrator’s act was 
arbitrary and capricious.  If the arbiter finds in favor of the plan participant 
or beneficiary, the decision can create a presumption in favor of the plan 
participant or beneficiary, thus shifting the burden onto the plan 
administrator to demonstrate that his act was not arbitrary and capricious.  
If the independent arbiter does not find an abuse of discretion, the plan 
participant or beneficiary is squarely where he would have been had an 
independent arbiter not been commissioned.  The independent arbiter 
could be paid by the plan participant individually, if he so elects to avail 
himself of that procedure, so as to reduce wasteful spending of plan assets 
for individual participant’s or beneficiary’s benefit. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
An across-the-board deference approach, alone, is unwarranted in 
light of Congressional intent and Firestone and its progeny.  As proposed 
by Tibble, as long as deference is granted somewhere in the plan, 
interpretative deference would include defining health conditions and 
benefit determinations.  Tibble, in failing to add procedural safeguards to 
its across-the-board deference approach, falls short of reaching a healthy 
balance so fruitfully sought by Congress and clearly identified by courts.  
The reasoning behind adopting across-the-board deference derives from 
precedent that adopts the spirit of trust principles into ERISA.  Trust 
principles, however, are not constant under all scenarios and 
circumstances.  Thus, a change in circumstance warrants a change in 
analysis. 
Trust principles promote discretion when the plan document grants 
discretion to a plan administrator’s interpretation under a certain 
circumstance; the circumstance in Firestone being a denial of benefits 
claims.  The legal ramifications and policy implication of across-the-board 
deference requires the adoption of additional safeguards.  A court would 
be injudicious to simply point to trust law as the be all and end all of 
interpretative discretion, if the plan says so and for the sake of simplicity.  
Each circumstance or plan provision where interpretative discretion is 
granted calls for a consideration of external factors that may outweigh the 
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deference suggested by trust law principles.  For example, Tibble’s across-
the-board deference would allow plan administrators, usually non-medical 
professional, to interpret medical conditions under a high threshold 
standard to determine whether such condition falls within the plan’s 
language.  And, while such practice is exercised today, a compromise must 
result from increase deference and lacking safeguards.  Increasing 
safeguards, in a time where the courts are leaning toward increased 
interpretative deference, is only natural. 
The resulting policy implication would likely avail plan participants 
and beneficiaries to the full receipt of retirement benefits, which results in 
fewer retirees depending on the United States’ Social Security or other 
governmental benefits.  Plan participants continue to fulfill plan vesting 
requirements to later suffer a deprivation of anticipated benefits because 
the plan administrator interpreted a provision ever so slightly in the 
sponsor’s favor.  Considering the preferential tax treatment and judicial 
stance on heightened deference, inadequate safeguards continue to 
stagnate.  The continued well-being and security of millions of employees 
and their dependents are directly affected by these plans and plan 
administrator’s interpretation.  A national public interest is at stake.  
Ultimately, implementing and adopting safeguards will equalize the 
balance between plan participants and beneficiaries, and plan 
administrators. 
